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iAbstract*
This paper reviews the contagion effects of the global financial crises of 1997-99 on five
small open economies: the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Israel and Poland. We
analyze how the financial markets of these countries were effected under different
exchange rate regimes. We look at the impact on exchange rates, interest rates and stock
markets. In order to shed some light on the behavior of financial asset holders at times
of global crises, we examine the sources of capital flows in Hungary for which country
we were able to gather the detailed data necessary for such an analysis. Based on our
findings, we offer some concluding remarks regarding the choice of exchange rate
regime and the role of capital controls.
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11. Introduction
The global financial crises of recent years brought into the fore once again the question
of appropriate exchange rate regime for small open economies particularly exposed to
speculative capital movements because of their status as emerging markets. These
countries are typically characterized by an interest rate premium vis-a-vis developed
countries because of the higher risks perceived by the markets and/or because the
authorities maintain high interest rates in order to bring inflation under control. Portfolio
investments in fixed income instruments, typically in government securities, or in other
forms are attracted to these countries to take advantage of the higher return when the
fundamentals look reasonably healthy, such as after successful stabilization policies.
Good fundamentals are not a precondition though, as evidenced by the large inflows
into Russian GKO’s prior to the summer of 1998. The foreign capital thus invested
remains volatile and tends to leave the emerging market countries suddenly when a
panic reaction develops in response to a financial crisis somewhere. Countries can be hit
by an outflow of capital even if they have been following sensible policies and their
trade and financial links to the country of origin of the crisis are weak.
There is a vast literature discussing the appropriate exchange rate regime for
countries facing volatile capital flows. Behind the discussion lies the suggestion that
there are trade-offs between the degree of flexibility of the exchange rate system on the
one hand, and the variability of the exchange rate and the level and volatility of interest
rates, on the other hand. We would like to contribute to the discussion in the literature
by examining the experiences of four European countries -- the Czech Republic, Greece,
Hungary and Poland -- and Israel. These countries share similarities from the point of
view of examining the effects of contagion. All five of them are small open economies
with weak economic and financial links to the countries where the recent financial crises
originated from, yet all of them were more or less seriously effected by the crises. They
are closer to the developed world than countries usually classified as emerging markets
because of the important trade links and financial integration with the industrialized
countries, nevertheless they have characteristics which have exposed them to swings in
capital flows. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are at an advanced stage of
accession negotiations with the European Union and are among those transition
2countries which have made the most progress toward full-fledged market economies.
However, they still have a long way to go to catch up with the industrialized world in
terms of modernization and standard of living. Greece has been a member of the
European Union (EU) since 1982, but its per capita income is the lowest within the EU
and it is not yet a member of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In Israel,
where per capita income is higher than that in some EU countries, the peace process has
often placed political issues at the center of government policies. These characteristics
have exposed these countries to volatile capital movements. Since they have adopted
different monetary and exchange rate regimes, it is interesting to examine if there are
any possible links between the contagion effects and the exchange regimes in place. 
There were three international financial crises in the past three years: the South-
East Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian crisis of 1998 and the Brazilian crisis of early
1999. The Asian crisis unfolded through a series of events, starting with the
announcement by the Bank of Thailand that it would let the bath float on July 2, 1997,
followed by the floating of the Indonesian rupee in August and of the Korean won in
December. Following these actions, all three currencies depreciated strongly and Asian
stock prices nose-dived, sending shock waves to stock exchanges throughout the world.
The heaviest impact on international stock prices took place in the wake of the nearly 25
percent fall of the Hong Kong stock market in October 20-231. The Russian crisis
unfolded significantly faster. Russian stock prices began to fall in May as market
confidence started to shake. The real crisis started on August 17 when the ruble was let
to float, leading to a sharp depreciation (210)2 of the Russian currency within the
following three weeks. At the same time, a 90-day moratorium was placed on private
external debt amortization, while it was announced that a compulsory restructuring of
domestic government debt would take place. The Russian events sent stock prices
falling around the world as well. The Russian default had a deep impact on Brazil where
capital outflows accelerated. The Brazilian authorities tried to contain the pressure on
the exchange rate by raising interest rates and offering additional incentives in the form
of interest rate and exchange rate guarantees to holders of government debt. In the end,
                                             
1 In the charts presented in this paper, we selected October 23, 1997 as the date to pinpoint the start of the
contagion effect of the Asian events.
2 The rates of depreciation mentioned in this paper are calculated on the basis of domestic currency unit
per foreign currency unit. 
3the Brazilian authorities were forced to let the currency float in January 1999, which led
to a depreciation of the real by 78 percent in the subsequent two months. The Brazilian
devaluation, too, sent jitters throughout the stock markets of the world.
The main spill-over effects of the financial crises on the five countries selected
were capital outflows accompanied by pressures on the exchange rates, upward
movements in interest rates and fall in equity prices. However, the magnitude and
duration of these effects varied. In most cases, the largest impact was caused by the
Russian crisis. This is not surprising given the geographic closeness of Russia to these
countries. The important point to note is that strong financial contagion occurred even
though these countries’ trade with Russia is small. For the three transition economies
considered, trade with Russia had been substantially reduced by 1997: exports to Russia
accounted for approximately 3 percent, 5 percent and 8 percent of total exports of the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, respectively (Table 1). About 77 percent of the
exports of Hungary, 70 percent of the exports of Poland and 65 percent of the exports of
the Czech Republic go to industrial countries. The exports to Russia of Greece and
Israel is even less: about 2 percent and 1 percent, respectively, of their total exports.
Clearly, the fact that the five countries considered are regarded as emerging markets or
catching-up economies geographically close to Russia played a dominant role in the
stronger contagion effects experienced by these countries following the Russian crisis.
Table 1: Percent Distribution of Trade Flows, 1997
Czech Rep. Greece Hungary Israel Poland
Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp.
Industrial countries 65.4 60.8 64.0 77.2 76.7 71.7 74.0 86.4 69.1 73.2
    US 2.4 3.9 5.2 3.7 3.2 3.8 33.6 20.2 2.6 4.5
    Europe 62.1 54.4 56.4 70.3 72.6 64.2 33.6 61.0 65.8 66.4
    o.w.: Austria 6.5 4.4 1.5 1.0 11.5 10.6 0.4 0.5 1.9 2.0
            France 3.1 3.8 4.5 9.4 3.8 4.0 2.9 4.1 8.7 5.9
            Germany 36.1 26.9 18.7 13.9 37.2 13.1 4.5 10.1 33.0 24.1
            Italy 3.7 5.4 14.0 18.1 6.2 7.4 2.9 7.4 5.9 9.9
            Netherlands 2.5 2.0 2.8 6.5 2.8 2.6 4.6 4.1 4.7 3.6
            UK 3.1 3.4 5.8 6.0 3.3 3.1 6.5 9.0 3.8 5.5
Developing Asia 3.0 5.3 3.5 4.8 1.1 6.4 14.3 7.7 2.6 8.1
    o.w.: crisis countries* 0.5 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.1 0.8 3.7 2.1 0.9 1.2
Developing Europe 28.6 31.9 22.0 6.7 20.2 19.6 5.8 3.2 25.2 15.5
    o.w.: Russia 3.3 6.8 1.9 0.8 5.1 9.2 1.2 0.6 8.4 6.4
            Slovak Rep. 12.9 8.4 0.1 0.1 1.4 1.9 0.1 0.0 1.2 1.2
Other 3.0 2.0 10.5 11.3 2.1 2.4 6.0 2.7 3.1 3.3
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.
* Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand
4Section 2 reviews briefly the monetary and exchange regimes and the
macroeconomic situation of the countries under study. This is followed by an
examination of the impact of the international financial crises on exchange rates
(Section 3), interest rates (Section 4) and stock markets (Section 5). In Section 6, we
analyze the sources of capital flows in Hungary in order to shed some light on the
behavior of financial asset holders at times of global crises. Hungary was the obvious
choice for us for that analysis because of our access to the relevant data and our
familiarity with the underlying developments. Finally, in Section 7 we present some
concluding remarks.
2. Monetary and Exchange Regimes and Macroeconomic Situation
The Czech koruna was fixed to a currency basket practically without band until
February 1996 when a  7.5 percent wide band around the fixed rate was introduced
(Chart 1a). In May 1997, speculation against the Czech koruna led to the abandonment
of the fixed rate and the adoption of a free floating and inflation targeting regime.3 In
Greece, the exchange regime was classified as managed floating prior to 1998 but, as
argued by Detragiache and Hamann (1997), the drachma was actually managed as a
crawling peg against the ECU, a development that seems to be confirmed by looking at
Chart 1b. In March 1998, following a step devaluation of 14 percent, Greece joined the
ERM with a  15 percent wide band. Greece’s announced policy goal is to join the euro
zone, hence its monetary regime can be regarded as a mix of inflation targeting and
exchange rate anchoring. 
Until March 1995, Hungary had an adjustable peg to a currency basket and the
forint was depreciated 22 times during the period from January 1990 to February 1995.
Since March 1995, Hungary has maintained a preannounced crawling peg with a
relatively narrow band of  2.25 percent against a currency basket (Chart 1c)4. The
monetary regime of Hungary can be characterized as an exchange rate anchored regime
where, taking into account the faster rate of productivity growth in Hungary compared
                                             
3 Lessons from the Czech exchange rate crisis is studied by Begg (1998).
4The introduction of the crawling band regime was preceded by a 9 percent devaluation. The rate of crawl
was reduced from 1.9 percent per month at the start of the crawling band regime to 0.5 percent per month
in July 1999.
5to its trading partners, the rate of crawl is set somewhat below the expected rate of
inflation differential so as to help disinflation while also maintaining competitiveness.
Israel moved from an adjustable band to a preannounced crawling band in December
1991. The band was widened in several steps to the current  15 percent (Chart 1d)5.
The monetary regime of Israel is more often characterized as inflation targeting,
although heavy central bank intervention that took place on several occasions is not
normally a characteristic of inflation targeting regimes. Finally, Poland has had a
preannounced crawling peg since October 1991, first with no band, then with a band
which was widened in steps to  15 percent currently (Chart 1e)6. The authorities
characterize their monetary regime as inflation targeting.
Thus, among the five countries examined, the exchange regimes in place during
the financial crises include a free floating regime (the Czech Republic); a fixed rate
regime with a wide band (Greece since March 98); and three preannounced crawling
bands, one of which with a narrow band (Hungary) and the two others with wide bands
(Israel and Poland). This gives an example of practically all the varieties of exchange
regimes with the exception of a rigidly fixed rate, which can only be maintained in the
                                             
5 In Israel, the rate of crawl was initially set at 9 percent per year and was preceded by a 3 percent
devaluation in December 1991. Subsequently, three smaller (1-3 percent) discrete devaluations were
effected. Currently, the rate of crawl is asymmetric: 2 percent per year for the strong edge of the band and
4 percent per year for the weak edge.
6 The rate of crawl was reduced from 1.8 percent per month in October 1991 to 0.3 percent per month in
March 1999. The introduction of the crawling band was not preceded by a step devaluation, but two
discrete devaluations of 10.7 percent and 7.4 percent and a revaluation of 6 percent were effected
subsequently.
6long run if several macroeconomic conditions are all met. This is rarely the case for
small open catching-up economies facing domestic inflationary pressures. A fixed rate,
such as under a currency board arrangement, may make sense under certain
circumstances, but such arrangements remain the exception even if their popularity
seems to have increased in recent years, particularly in transition economies.7 
                                             
7 Problems with exchange rate fixing are emphasized, inter alia, in Begg-Wyplosz (1999), Mishkin
(1998), Obstfeld (1995) and Obstfeld-Rogoff (1995). 
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Chart 1/a: Nominal Exchange Rate of the Czech Koruna, January 1996 - August 1999
Basket used prior to May 1997:  65% DEM  - 35% USD. We used the same basket for the floating period for comparision purposes.
Band abandoned,
Koruna let to float
Asian crises
(Oct.23, 97)
Russian stock
market crisis
Russian
devaluation
Brazilian
devaluationWidth of the band:
 +/- 0,5 %
Width of the band:
 +/- 7,5 %
85,35
5,45
5,55
5,65
5,75
5,85
5,95
6,05
01
.02
.91
06
.21
.91
12
.10
.91
05
.28
.92
11
.16
.92
05
.05
.93
10
.22
.93
04
.12
.94
09
.29
.94
03
.20
.95
09
.06
.95
02
.23
.96
08
.13
.96
01
.30
.97
07
.21
.97
01
.07
.98
06
.26
.98
12
.15
.98
06
.03
.99
l
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
 
o
f
 
d
r
a
c
h
m
a
 
p
e
r
 
E
C
U
,
 
E
U
R
 
(
i
n
v
e
r
t
e
d
 
s
c
a
l
e
)
5,35
5,45
5,55
5,65
5,75
5,85
5,95
6,05
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Naturally, the macroeconomic situation also has an influence on how the
markets perceive the risks in a country at a time of international financial crisis.
The current account deficit -- a much watched indicator to assess risks --
narrowed in the Czech Republic, Greece and Israel, while it widened in Poland
and Hungary between 1996 and 1998 (Table 2). In 1998, the lowest current
account deficit was recorded in the Czech Republic (1.8 percent of GDP) and the
highest in Hungary (4.8 percent) and Poland (4.4 percent). Inflation has been on a
downward trend in all five countries over the past several years, although it
increased temporarily in the Czech Republic in 1997-98 and in Israel in the
second part of 1998 (Chart 2). The rate of inflation in July 1999 was the highest
in Hungary (10.1 percent) and the lowest in the Czech Republic (1.1 percent) and
Greece (2.1 percent). The rates of GDP growth slowed in the Czech Republic,
Israel and Poland in 1997-98 and increased in Greece and Hungary. The highest
rates of growth were recorded in Poland and Hungary, in the range of 6 to 5
percent on average over the two years 1997-98. The lowest growth was
experienced in the Czech Republic where GDP actually declined by about 2
percent in 1998. Overall, it can be said that during the period of the international
financial crises from mid-1997 to early 1999, none of the countries considered
suffered major macroeconomic imbalances, although some of them exhibited
weaknesses, such as the widening current account deficits in Hungary and Poland
and the fall in GDP in the Czech Republic.
Table 2: Growth, Current Accounts and Budget Balances, 1994-98
Gross domestic product
(percent change)
 Current account (percent of
GDP)
General government balance
(percent of GDP)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Czech R. 3.2 6.4 3.9 1.0 -2.3 -2.1 -2.7 -7.6 -6.1 -1.9 -2.5 -2.3 -2.3 -1.6
Greece 2.1 2.0 2.6 3.2 3.7 -0.1 -2.5 -3.7 -2.6 -2.6 -10.0 -10.3 -7.5 -4.0 -2.5
Hungary 2.9 1.6 1.3 4.6 5.1 -9.4 -5.6 -3.9 -2.2 -4.8 -9.6 -7.3 -4.6 -5.1 -4.9
Israel 6.8 7.1 4.5 2.3 2.0 -4.8 -6.1 -6.6 -3.3 -3.0 -1.2 -3.2 -4.1 -2.4
Poland 4.8 7.9 6.1 6.9 4.8 1.0* 0.7* -1.0* -3.1* -4.4* -3.2 -3.3 -3.6 -3.3 -3.0
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook; BIS: Annual
Reports; National Bank of Hungary: Annual Reports
* Data on current account includes the surplus on unrecorded trade transactions as estimated by
the IMF.
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2. Impact on Exchange Rates
Following the Asian and Russian crises, the nominal exchange rates depreciated in all
five countries under review due to an outflow of capital (Charts 3a and 3b)8. The Asian
crisis brought less depreciation than the Russian crisis, which underlines the
significance of the regional aspect of market reactions. Following the Brazilian
devaluation, only the three transition countries experienced a depreciation of their
currencies, indicating that this group of countries remains especially exposed to
contagion. After each crisis-induced depreciation, all currencies strengthened,  showing
that the contagion effect typically contained an element of overshooting. However, the
strength of the recovery varied. The Czech koruna depreciated after the Brazilian crisis
even more than following the Russian events and the subsequent recovery of the
currency was much weaker. This coincided with the weakening of growth performance
of the Czech economy and the wider recognition that the Czech Republic has been
lagging behind the other two transition countries in the area of structural reforms. This
                                             
8 In order to obtain a better comparison, we used for all five countries the same basket of currencies to
calculate the nominal and real exchange rates. This is an average trade-weighted basket of the five
countries. The weights are the following (in percent): Germany, 39.1; Italy, 14.5; USA, 14.9; United
Kingdom, 8.9; France, 9.0; Austria, 7.2; Netherlands, 6.5. We used the same basket to derive foreign
interest rate when calculating interest rate premia below. 
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may be a sign that following an initial contagion effect, markets tend to become more
sensitive to the underlying fundamentals of the economy. The lowering of interest rates
by the Czech authorities in response to the slowdown in growth and an unexpectedly
low inflation9 has no doubt also contributed to the depreciation of the koruna. The
Polish zloty did not recover its pre-Brazilian crisis strength either. The pronounced
deterioration of Poland’s current account may have played a role in that development.
As expected, the depreciations were larger in the Czech Republic, Israel and Poland
which have maintained more flexible exchange rate regimes than in Hungary which has
kept a narrow band regime. The smallest depreciation on a trade-weighted basis took
place in Greece, despite the wide band within the ERM. Clearly, Greece seems to have
benefited from the credibility provided by the policy commitments associated with
membership in ERM, which has been accompanied by an improvement in the external
position and a decline in the rate of inflation.
The case of Israel illustrates the problems that swings in capital flows can cause.
In May 1995, the Bank of Israel widened the band to ± 7 percent which was followed by
an appreciation of the sheqel within the band. The continuous upward pressure on the
exchange rate prompted the central bank to intervene and international reserves doubled
within a year between mid-1996 and mid-1997. To relieve the upward pressure on the
exchange rate by creating more uncertainty, the Bank of Israel widened the band to ± 14
percent in July 1997, but it did it asymmetrically by widening only the weak side of the
band. It also reduced interest rates in steps by a total of 350 basis points. Nonetheless,
the sheqel remained at or close to the strong edge of the band up to two months prior to
the Russian crisis. Following the crisis, the sheqel depreciated by 20 percent and the
central bank was forced to raise interest rates in two steps by a total of 400 basis points
to defend the currency, even though the economy had shown signs of recession at that
time (industrial production had fallen and GDP growth had slowed from 6 percent to
less than 2 percent). The fact that in just a few months a strong pressure for appreciation
turned into a strong pressure for depreciation triggering wide fluctuations in interest
rates shows the damaging impact of speculative capital flows against which a wide band
                                             
9 The inflation target of the Czech National Bank is defined in terms of ‘net inflation’ and was set at 4
percent for 1999. Actual net inflation was minus 0.6 percent in June 1999. 
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does not necessarily provide protection on the grounds that it is less vulnerable to
attacks than a fixed or a narrow band regime.
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Developments in the real exchange rates show the impact on competitiveness of
different exchange rate regimes adopted (Chart 4). In the more flexible regimes of the
Czech Republic and Poland, the real rates were allowed to appreciate significantly in
response to the capital inflows. The authorities of these two countries probably hoped
that the nominal appreciation will simply lower inflation without lasting impact on
competitiveness. They may also have wanted to avoid the cost of sterilized intervention,
although the central bank of Poland is reported to have intervened on several occasions
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to limit the appreciation of the zloty.10 In Hungary, on the other hand, the authorities
have limited the appreciation by keeping the exchange rate within the narrow band
through sterilized intervention. The Hungarian authorities placed special emphasis on
maintaining competitiveness, due in part to the relatively high external indebtedness of
the country. Nonetheless, disinflation in Hungary has been approximately as fast as in
Poland where the real exchange rate appreciated significantly (see Chart 2). Sterilization
in Hungary, of course, involved budgetary costs, but as demonstrated in Szapáry and
Jakab (1998) that cost was relatively limited (estimated at 0.16 percent of GDP per year
from March 1995 to end-1997) compared to the benefits provided by the maintenance of
competitiveness and the credibility of the exchange rate which, inter alia, helped to
obtain lower interest rate premia as compared to the Czech Republic and Poland (see
below). In Greece, the noteworthy development is the modest but continuous real
appreciation over the past several years, indicating the emphasis placed by the
authorities on reducing inflation to meet the Maastricht criteria.
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Table 3 reveals a significant relationship between the variability of the real
exchange rate and the exchange regime. As one would expect, the most rigid regime, the
fixed exchange rate without band in the Czech Republic until February 1996, resulted in
the most stable real exchange rate. This is followed in terms of variability by the narrow
band crawling peg regime of Hungary and the de facto managed crawling peg regime of
                                             
10 Between end–1995 and July 1998, Poland’s international reserves grew by about 10 billion dollars to
25 billion dollars. 
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Greece prior to March 1998. The wider crawling bands of Israel and Poland and the free
floating regime of the Czech Republic after February 1996 led to much more
pronounced real rates variations. These findings seem to hold irrespective of the time
period considered, since the Hungarian and Greek rate variability increased only slightly
during the crises periods of 1997-99. The fact that Greek rate variability did not increase
when Greece moved to the wider band within ERM suggests that when credibility is
enhanced by underlying policies, this becomes a more important factor effecting
variability than the regime itself.
Table 3: Real Exchange Rate Variability, 1994-99
Czech Republic Greece Hungary Israel Poland
CS SD AC CS SD AC CS SD AC CS SD AC CS SD AC 
94 0.81 0.59 0.62 1.23 0.99 0.75 1.21 1.59 1.16 1.45 1.30 1.11 2.03 1.03 0.86
95 0.61 0.46 0.57 1.24 1.08 0.89 1.28 0.87 0.72 1.60 1.09 0.82 1.92 1.50 1.24
96 0.85 0.88 0.81 1.28 1.39 1.20 1.30 1.06 0.82 1.39 1.01 1.05 1.94 1.35 1.05
97 2.45 2.08 1.88 1.25 1.14 0.92 1.30 0.95 0.74 1.72 1.64 1.48 1.96 1.59 1.18
98 2.54 2.33 2.05 1.31 1.73 1.44 1.22 1.46 1.10 3.02 3.13 2.16 2.52 4.63 3.41
99.I-VII. 3.73 2.57 2.05 1.21 0.95 0.69 1.17 1.61 1.30 1.55 1.44 1.70 3.33 1.69 1.50
Sources: Calculations based on data in IMF, International Financial Statistics
Calculated on the basis of annual averages of  monthly data multiplied by 100.
CS: Conditional standard deviation calculated form the GARCH(1,1) model specified as
rer t rer u ut t t t t t              0 1 1 1
2
0 1
2
2 1
2,  for time period January 1993 -
April 1999, where rert is the logarithm of the real exchange rate, t is the time trend, ut is error
term with conditional variance 2t ; i and  i are parameters. The Lagrange Multiplier ARCH
test rejected the null of no conditional heteroskedasticity in Greece (4%), Israel (1%), and
Poland (2%), while it did not reject in cases of the Czech Republic and Hungary. Nonetheless
we estimated the model for the latter two countries as well for comparison purposes.
SD: standard deviation of changes of the logarithm of the real exchange rate.
AC: absolute change of the logarithm of the real exchange rate.
Opinions differ on how bad real exchange rate variability actually is. Those who
tend to dismiss its potential negative influences generally argue that well functioning
financial markets allow the hedging of exchange rate risk and, therefore, variability
leads to no change in profits if all transactions are hedged. This argument has some
serious weaknesses. Uncertainties regarding the duration of exchange rate deviations
necessarily make hedging imperfect. Hedging instruments are typically available for up
to one year which may be shorter than the planning period of exporters and importers.
Furthermore, exchange rate hedging can only stabilize the nominal value of export
receipts and import costs, but does not provide insurance against the domestic cost
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consequences of exchange rate changes. In addition, all risk hedging involves costs,
including indirect costs arising from misjudging the duration of the deviation of the
exchange rate. Hence, variability makes cash flow planning more uncertain which
adversely effects investment decisions11. This is even more so for  transition economies
where access to the derivative markets is limited by liquidity constraints due to the
generally small size of market participants. Under the current conditions of high capital
mobility which exposes small open emerging markets to contagion effects, a free
floating regime or a crawling peg with a wide band carries the danger of excessive real
exchange rate variability with negative effects on resource allocation.
3. Impact on Interest Rates
The financial crises had different effects on nominal interest rates in the countries under
consideration (Charts 5a and 5b). Looking at the three transition countries, the Asian
and Brazilian events had little or no effect on short-term (3 months) nominal interest
rates12. The Russian crisis did not effect significantly the short-term nominal interest
rates in the Czech Republic and Poland, but increased the three-month nominal rate by
about 4-5 percentage points (to 20-21 percent) in Hungary13. Thus, one could argue that
the less flexible exchange rate regime led to a jump in interest rates in Hungary; had the
exchange rate been let to depreciate further, interest rates would not have increased.
                                             
11 Campa (1993) empirically analyzed entry and exit decisions to markets in the US and found that real
exchange rate variability negatively correlates with investment decisions. Baldwin and Krugman (1989)
present models that demonstrate possible persistent trade effects of large real exchange rate movements.
Analyzing French job reallocation, Gourinchas (1999) found that real exchange rate movements have
substantial impact on job creation and destruction in the traded goods sector.
12 In these countries, long-term domestic credits are almost exclusively granted at variable interest rates,
generally tied to short-term interest rates. The most widely used benchmark rate is the three-month interest
rate.
13 The interest rate on five-year government bonds in the Czech Republic increased by 2 percentage
points, though.
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However, a more nuanced conclusion emerges if one looks at the evolution of
interest rate premia, calculated as the difference between domestic and foreign interest
rates adjusted for the preannounced exchange rate depreciation where such a regime was
in effect  (Charts 6a and 6b)14. From mid-1997 until the Russian crisis, the interest rate
premium in Hungary was much lower than in the other two transition countries. This
probably reflected the good fundamentals of the Hungarian economy (accelerating
growth rate, falling inflation and declining fiscal and current account deficits), which
strengthened the credibility of the narrow band exchange rate regime. Following the
Russian crisis, the fear of contagion, coupled as it was with a weakening of Hungary’s
external position, generated more uncertainty regarding the Hungarian exchange rate
regime, which caused the interest rate premium to increase, but only to the level of that
of the Czech Republic and Poland. Therefore, a more valid argument would be that a
certain level of risk commands a certain level of premium and that following the
Russian crisis, the risk of Hungary perceived by the markets increased to the level which
had prevailed in the two other transition countries, irrespective of the exchange regime
                                             
14 We calculated the interest rate premium in the following way. Domestic interest rates are determined by
foreign interest rates, the expected change in the exchange rate, plus some risk premium provided that
uncovered interest parity do not hold:
         sttststtsttsttt AFXERPAFXECPRFXERPFXERR  
** ,
where tR  is the domestic interest rate for s periods; 
*
tR  is the foreign interest rate for s periods;
 stFXE   is the expected change of the exchange rate in s periods ahead;   stt FXERP   is the risk
premium that is the function of the expected change of the exchange rate; stCP   is the announced
depreciation for s periods ahead, and  stAFXE   is the expected change within the band or the
expected devaluation of the band. As it is indicated by the equation, the expected exchange rate change
can be decomposed into preannounced depreciation (which is zero in a fixed or a freely floating exchange
rate regime) and an additional depreciation expectation over the preannounced depreciation. Lack of data
for exchange rate expectations allows us only to calculate the sum of two components,
    sttststttt AFXERPAFXECPRRIP  
* ,
where tIP  stands for the interest rate premium. The problem with this measure of interest rate premium is
that in a wide band or free floating system it does not take into account the expectation of a depreciation
beyond the preannounced rate of depreciation. Nonetheless we believe that assessing the risk attributed to
fixed income investment in domestic currency is better measured this way than by the simple interest rate
differential because it takes into account the preannounced element of the exchange rate risk where such
element exists.
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in effect. As tensions in the international financial markets eased, the premia in all three
transition countries declined in the later part of 1998, but the premium in Hungary
remained at roughly the same level as in the other two transition countries. In other
words, the regional effect became dominant and Hungary was no longer able to benefit
from lower risk premium by distinguishing itself from the other countries by its
economic performance. It is important to point out the regional effect, as it shows that at
a time of a financial crisis in a region, markets suddenly reassess the risks attributed to
those countries of that region which are regarded as emerging markets. In the two
transition countries where the current account and fiscal deficits have widened –
Hungary and Poland – the interest rate premia have increased since early 1999 and stood
at about the same level in both countries in July. These similar developments took place
both in a narrow and a wide band exchange regime.
The case of Israel after the Russian crisis reinforces the impression that the
nature of the exchange regime had less of an effect on how interest rates reacted to the
crisis. Despite the wider exchange rate band, the interest rate premia increased in Israel,
and even more sharply than in Hungary. A slight difference with Hungary is that in
Israel the central bank took the lead and raised interest rates, while in Hungary the
central bank followed the rise in market rates. In Hungary, the central bank intervened
for a few weeks to keep the forint within the narrow band, but there was no need for
continuous intervention which was spread over four weeks during the period from late
August to mid-October and the loss of reserves was relatively limited (see below). 
From the point of view of our analysis, the conclusion of these developments is
that contagion led to an increase in interest rate premia in a narrow as well as a wide
crawling band regime. Greek interest rate developments further support the view that it
is credibility rather than the regime that matters. After the Asian crisis, the three- month
nominal interest rate rose sharply for a prolonged period (long-term interest rates also
rose), while after the Russian crisis there was only a small and short-lived rise in interest
rates. This probably reflects the increased credibility associated with the policy
commitments of membership in the ERM and the improvement in the external position
and the progress with disinflation.
Table 4 shows real interest rate developments. Measuring real interest rates is
always hindered by the lack of data for inflationary expectations. This is particularly so
in periods of relatively rapid disinflation; using past inflation as a proxy might overstate
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expectations, while using actual inflation one year ahead probably understates
expectations, in addition to losing the most recent year from the sample. To overcome
this problem, we used two proxies: past inflation and a vector autoregressive (VAR)
model for estimating expectations15. Table 4 shows real interest rates calculated with
both measures of inflation expectations. The data confirm our previous finding on
interest rate premia: Hungary benefited from lower real rates than the Czech Republic
and Poland during 1996-97 when the narrow crawling band enjoyed high credibility and
the risk premium was lower16. It is noteworthy that Greece had the highest real rates
among the countries considered throughout 1996-99, a sign that disinflation has a price
when a country has a long track record of high inflation; Greece experienced 10 percent
to 25 percent inflation rates per year from the first oil shock up to 1994.
Table 4: Real Interest Rates, 1994-99
Czech
Republic
Greece Hungary Israel Poland
P M P M P M P M P M 
94 -1.2 -5.0 10.5 10.3 9.4 3.8 0.7 0.1 -1.4 -1.5
95 1.3 -1.6 7.2 6.2 6.1 8.2 4.3 4.0 -0.4 -0.7
96 3.1 0.2 5.3 6.0 2.0 2.2 4.7 6.7 1.4 2.3
97 6.0 5.7 7.1 6.0 2.8 1.3 5.0 4.6 7.5 5.0
98 3.6 5.6 8.7 7.4 4.2 5.4 7.0 4.2 7.0 8.8
99.I-VII. 4.8 -2.7 7.2 8.5 6.2 5.6 6.3 6.7 7.3 9.9
Source: Calculations based on data in IMF, International Financial Statistics and data from
Reuters
                                             
15 In order to proxy inflationary expectations we estimated VARs with three variables: excess twelve
months consumer price increase over foreign inflation, twelve months nominal depreciation, and interest
rate differential. All three variables of each countries seemed to be nonstationary according to several unit
root tests. In order to derive forecasts, the rationale of estimating a VAR for integrated variables instead of
a VAR for their stationary transformation or instead of a vector error correction model (VECM) is
discussed, for example, in Hamilton (1994) p. 651-653. For each months during January 1994 - May 1999
we estimated the VAR using data from only the most recent four years with appropriately selected lag
length. This rolling estimating procedure seemed sensible since structural changes make past information
less informative for the future. Of course, shorter sample leads to more uncertainty in the estimates and
made us to set the largest possible length of the VAR to 4. In each month, we generated out of sample
forecast of the inflation differential twelve months ahead that we added to current foreign inflation, that is,
we assumed that that foreign inflation is expected to be unchanged in a year.
16 A comparison of real interest rates among countries needs to consider the different cyclical positions.
The slowdown in growth in Hungary in 1995-96 and the Czech Republic in 1998-99 probably had a
downward impact on real interest rates in these countries.
24
Annual averages of  monthly data.
In column P, we used past inflation to calculate real interest rates, in column M, we used model
based inflationary expectations. See Footnote 15.
Interest rates used are: PRIBOR for the Czech Republic, ATHIBOR for Greece, Treasury bill
rate for Hungary and Israel, and WIBOR for Poland. All are three-month interest rates.
Since exchange rate variability was lower in Hungary with a narrow band
exchange regime than in the Czech Republic, Israel and Poland with a more-flexible
exchange system, a question to be asked is whether that led to greater variability in
interest rates in Hungary. Table 5 reveals that during the crisis years of 1997-99,
Hungary experienced on average the lowest variability of three-month nominal interest
rates among the five countries considered. Looking at real interest rates, a similar
picture emerges. One can not conclude from these observations that the lower exchange
rate variability in Hungary translated into higher interest rate variability. Instead, the
general picture emerging from Table 5 is that interest rate variability was higher under
the more flexible exchange rate regimes of the other countries. This observation is in
line with the findings of McKinnon (1996) who found that long-term interest rates in
developed countries were more volatile under floating than under fixed rate exchange
regimes. He explains this by the occasionally erratic speculation in foreign exchange
markets which increases risk premium and renders interest rates more volatile.
25
Table 5: Variability of Three-Month Interest Rates, 1997-99
Nominal interest rates
Czech
Rep.
Greece Hungary Israel Poland
1997 1.55 2.64 0.28 0.45 0.47
1998 0.62 1.33 0.68 1.01 0.52
1999.I-VIII. 0.49 0.39 0.40 0.18 0.61
Average of
1997-99 0.88 1.45 0.45 0.54 0.53
Real interest rates*
Czech
Rep.
Greece Hungary Israel Poland
1997 2.13 2.66 0.50 0.66 0.66
1998 1.20 1.62 0.83 1.00 0.53
1999.I-VII. 0.73 0.49 0.53 0.46 0.34
Average of
1997-99 1.35 1.59 0.62 0.71 0.51
Real interest rates**
Czech
Rep.
Greece Hungary Israel Poland
1997 2.17 2.28 0.80 0.87 2.03
1998 1.71 1.86 1.66 1.74 3.21
1999.I-VII. 3.57 1.43 1.87 0.79 1.48
Average of
1997-99 2.49 1.86 1.44 1.13 2.24
Variability is defined as standard deviation of monthly changes.
* Real interest rates calculated with past inflation
** Real interest rates calculated with model based expectations
Source: Calculations based on data in IMF, International Financial Statistics
4. Stock Market Reactions
The regional aspect of contagion is demonstrated also in the behavior of equity prices in
the five countries considered, which fell much more strongly in the wake of the Russian
events than following the other crises (Chart 7)17. The most salient feature of Chart 7 is
the strong performance of the Hungarian stock market during 1996-97, followed by a
sharp drop after the Russian crisis. From end-1995 up to the Asian events, Hungarian
prices tripled in dollar terms, vastly outperforming the other stock exchanges. Following
                                             
17 Throughout Europe, the Russian crisis sent down stock market prices much more sharply than either the
Asian or the Brazilian events. On the other hand, the Asian crises effected much more than the Russian
crisis the prices on the Tokyo stock exchange. Stock prices in the United States were more effected by the
Russian than the Asian events. 
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the Russian crisis, Hungarian stock prices fell by 55 percent and have, like in the Czech
Republic and Poland, only partly recovered since then. The deterioration of the current
account positions of Hungary and Poland and the weak growth performance of the
Czech economy may have contributed to the failure of the stock prices to recover their
pre-Russian crisis levels.
A question to be asked is why Hungarian stock prices performed so differently
from those of the other two transition countries. The rapid growth in 1996-97 may be
explained in part by the credibility of policies, buttressed by the success of the
stabilization efforts and the progress in privatization and structural reforms. Hungary
has attracted by far the most foreign direct investment per capita in the region18,
enhancing the expectations for economic growth. One could also argue that the lower
Hungarian real interest rates contributed to the rapid stock price increase in 1996-97
and, after the Russian crisis, the expected rise in real interest rates contributed to the
sharp fall in equity prices. If this were true and a link could be established between the
increase of the Hungarian real interest rates and the narrow band exchange system – a
link that, as seen, our analysis does not confirm – one could argue that the drop in stock
prices is indication of the cost of maintaining a narrow band.
                                             
18 Per capita foreign direct investment during the period from 1998 to June 1998 totaled more than 1600
dollars in Hungary, as compared with about 900 dollars in the Czech Republic, and 300 dollars in Poland
(source: United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe).
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In our view, the drop in Hungarian stock prices after the Russian crisis has to be
seen against their earlier rapid growth. This growth built on the credibility of the
stabilization-cum-reform polices, but contained an element of overreaction. As can be
seen from Table 6, futures Budapest Stock Index (BUX) open positions rose from
0.0025 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter of 1995 to 0.31 percent of GDP in the third
quarter of 1997. During the same period, the turnover of futures BUX contracts
increased from 0.03 percent to 8.3 percent of GDP. When there is this kind of increase
in a relatively short period of time in futures open positions and transactions, the
existence of overreaction can not be disregarded. The rapid development of the BUX
futures market provided opportunities for both domestic and foreign investors to take up
leveraged long speculative positions. The overreaction was helped by stock buying
through margin loans which reached relatively high levels in Hungary.19 There was also
a strong tax incentive for buying shares listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange. The
incentive was introduced in 1995 to promote the development of the capital market:
investors holding stocks got a tax credit equivalent to 30 percent of the additional
investment is stocks20. The overreaction is evidenced by the fact that the implied interest
rate content of futures contracts of the BUX largely exceeded the six months Treasury
bill rates until the Asian financial crisis (Chart8).21 Following the Russian crisis, an
initial drop in stock prices led to the liquidation of both open futures positions – as
evidenced by the dramatic fall of implied interest rate content – and margin loans. Both
induced heightened spot sales and price declines.
                                             
19 Both futures trade in the stock index and buying through margin lending were negligible in the Czech
Republic and Poland.
20 Beginning in 1999, the tax credit was reduced to 20 percent of the additional investment in stocks and a
maximum limit of 200,000 forints (about 820 dollars) was placed on the tax credit that one can claim in
any one year. No such limit existed prior to 1999.
21 The fact that the large differential between the implied interest rate and the Treasury bill rate was not
arbitraged away prior to the financial crises probably reflects the relative inexperience of the Hungarian
market participants with this kind of arbitrage opportunity.
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Table 6:Turnover and Open Positions at the Futures Market of the Budapest Stock Index
(BUX), 1995-99
Quarterly futures BUX
turnover (percent of
quarterly GDP)
Futures BUX open
positions (percent of
annual GDP)
1995 Q2 0.003 0.0003
1995 Q3 0.007 0.0007
1995 Q4 0.025 0.0024
1996 Q1 0.145 0.0068
1996 Q2 0.300 0.0144
1996 Q3 0.832 0.0335
1996 Q4 1.368 0.0565
1997 Q1 5.243 0.1289
1997 Q2 5.479 0.1850
1997 Q3 6.510 0.3106
1997 Q4 8.328 0.1898
1998 Q1 5.992 0.1365
1998 Q2 5.739 0.0674
1998 Q3 3.621 0.0586
1998 Q4 3.065 0.0693
1999 Q1 2.885 0.0586
1999 Q2 2,967 0.0703
Source: Calculations based on data from the Budapest Stock Exchange.
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These factors seem to better explain the movements in Hungarian stock prices
prior and after the financial crises than developments in real interest rate expectations. It
is estimated that about 70 percent of the stocks listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange
are owned by non-residents who account for 70-80 percent of the turnover. It is
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reasonable to assume that non-residents do not wish to spend all their future income in
Hungary and therefore Hungarian real interest rates are probably not a very important
factor in determining their decisions to buy or sell Hungarian stocks. Furthermore, non-
residents evaluate expected real interest rates in conjunction with expected real
exchange rates. The currencies in the Czech Republic and Poland appreciated much
more than the Hungarian forint so that investing in assets in these countries would have,
ceteris paribus, assured higher returns in dollar terms. Nevertheless, stock prices
stagnated in dollar terms in those two countries. On the other hand, in Greece, where
real interest rates were the highest among the five countries considered and rose in 1998,
stock prices nearly tripled between January 1998 and July 1999. Finally, it should be
pointed out that stock prices in Hungary, even though they fell more sharply after the
Russian crisis than stock prices in the Czech Republic and Poland, increased faster after
the crisis than the stock prices in the other two countries (Chart 7b). It is reasonable to
conclude from these observations that interest rate developments did not play any
significant role in the fall of Hungarian stock prices. If the narrow band exchange
system had any effect on stock price developments, it probably cushioned the fall in
prices and helped the subsequent recovery, since the exchange rate kept its credibility
during the crisis as there was no strong attack against the currency: purchases of foreign
exchange at the futures markets, which characterized the adjustable peg regime prior to
the introduction of the crawling peg, did not take place to any significant extent during
the Russian crisis.
5. Capital Flows in Hungary
The case of Hungary permits a closer look at how contagion effected capital flows.
Basically, there were three channels through which crisis induced conversions between
foreign exchange and domestic currency took place in the wake of the international
financial crises. The most important channel was non-resident holdings of Hungarian
forint denominated government securities (Chart 9). As the crawling band exchange
regime gained credibility and the exchange rate remained at the strong edge of the band,
foreigners bought government securities to take advantage of the prevailing interest rate
premium. After the Asian crisis, non-resident holdings of government securities fell by
about 300 million dollars, from a level just over 600 million dollars. In the subsequent
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ten months, these holdings jumped to almost two billion dollars only to fall back to
about 700 million dollars following the Russian crisis. They rose again to reach 1.6
billion dollars by early 1999. These movements led to wide swings in the demand for
Hungarian forints which paralleled closely the fluctuations in the exchange rate. The
sharp increase in non-resident holdings during the first eight months of 1998 took place
at a time of narrowing interest rate premium, which must have reflected the enhanced
credibility of the exchange rate.
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Chart 9: Hungary: Non-Resident Holdings of Forint Denominated Government
                Securities, January 1997 - August 1999
The Hungarian authorities have tried to discourage the inflow of potentially
fickle capital by prohibiting non-resident holdings of government securities with an
original maturity of less than one year. The restriction was backed up by moral suasion
and sanctions against those banks which tried to circumvent the restriction by entering
into short-term repurchase agreements at the time of the purchase of the government
security22. The experience of the Hungarian authorities is that these restrictive measures
have muted the inflow of short-term speculative capital.
A second important channel of conversions between foreign exchange and
domestic currency was forward and futures sales of foreign exchange. Since confidence
in the exchange rate remained strong, a convenient way for making profit from the
                                             
22 The sanctions included fines and the temporary suspension of access to the central bank’s repo
facilities.
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existing interest rate premium was through the forward and futures markets.23 Resident
speculators sold forward foreign exchange to resident banks either on the interbank
forward market or on the futures markets at the two Budapest exchanges.24 The banks
sold a similar amount of foreign exchange at the spot market and invested the forints
received in government securities or deposited them with the NBH. By these operations,
the open foreign exchange positions of the banks did not change, hence their profits
were not dependent on changes in the exchange rate. Banks obtained the foreign
exchange sold at the spot market either from borrowing from abroad, which increased
by about one billion dollar during January-July 1998 (Table 7), or from foreign
exchange deposits held by enterprises and households in Hungary, which the banks have
partly redeposited with the NBH. Since the opening of futures positions required a
deposit of only 3 percent of the contract value, speculators could make large profits if
the preannounced rate of crawl was kept and the exchange rate remained at the strong
edge of the band, a risk that many speculators were prepared to take given the exchange
rate’s  previous track record within the band. During 1996-97, when the interest rate
premium fell to 3-4 percentage points, the return on such speculation was still above
100 percent.
                                             
23 Credibility of the crawling peg exchange rate regime and developments of the futures market is
analyzed in more detail in Darvas (1996).
24 Futures foreign exchange transactions can be carried out at both the Budapest Commodity Exchange
and the Budapest Stock Exchange. While non-residents are allowed to carry out futures BUX transactions
within certain limits, only residents are allowed to carry out foreign exchange derivative transactions in
Hungary.
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Table 7: Capital Flows in Hungary, 1998-99 (millions of dollars)
Jan. –
Jul.
1998
Aug. –
Oct.
1998
Nov.
1998 –
Feb.
1999
March
– May
1999
Balance of payments
1. Current account -1072 -373 -1092 -596
2. Net direct investment 1002 136 555 195
3. Non-resident portfolio investment in government bonds * 1460 -1131 715 -6
4. Non-resident portfolio investment in stocks 342 -37 417 356
5. Change in commercial banks assets ** 7 -144 10 -414
6. Change in commercial banks liabilities ** 864 -606 -174 31
7. Government and NBH net borrowing from abroad -1174 -79 938 44
8. Other inflows, net -172 348 307 23
9. Net errors and omissions 219 52 -163 -76
10. Valuation change of reserves -131 332 -340 -228
11. Change in reserves 1345 -1501 1172 -672
Memorandum items
11. NBH foreign exchange intervention 3377 -2515 358 59
12. Change in open futures foreign exchange positions 526 -953 -321 -144
13. Change in commercial banks foreign exchange deposits at
the NBH **
-595 966 292 -301
14. Change in commercial banks net foreign exchange credits to
enterprises **
423 32 102 -27
15. Change in household foreign exchange deposits 13 213 -83 -101
16. = Principal causes of NBH intervention (3 + 4 + 12) 2328 -2121 811 205
Sources: National Bank of Hungary and Budapest Stock and Commodity Exchanges
*: Hungarian forint denominated government bonds.
**: The term “commercial banks” refers to resident credit institutions.
As can be seen from Chart 10, the open positions at the futures foreign exchange
markets started to increase in mid-1995 to reach 1.9 billion dollars by June 199825.
Depreciation of the forint within the band, followed by the increase in interest rates after
the Russian crisis, forced speculators to buy from banks foreign exchange forward in
order to liquidate their positions. Banks, to remain within the statutory limits on their
open positions, bought from the NBH foreign exchange at the spot, which they sold at
the futures market to the speculators. The unwinding of the speculators’ positions and
the associated reduction in the banks’ net foreign asset position strongly contributed to
the depreciation of the forint within the band and the need for the NBH to intervene.
                                             
25 No accurate data are available for forward foreign exchange transactions on the interbank market. Chart
10 therefore only shows futures foreign exchange open positions at the Budapest exchanges. Most foreign
exchange derivative transactions took place at the futures markets.
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During the post-Russian crisis period of August-October 1998, the open futures foreign
exchange positions decreased by one billion dollars and the net foreign asset position of
banks fell by about 700 million dollars. Chart 10 shows that the open futures foreign
exchange positions dropped to an insignificant amount by early 1999. This is a clear
indication that the build-up of open positions was associated with pure speculation of
resident market participants and with the corresponding interest rate arbitrage of the
domestic banking sector, and had little to do with genuine hedging of export and import
transactions. It is important to note that only residents were allowed to have open futures
foreign exchange positions at the Budapest stock exchanges: the exclusion of non-
residents with greater capital strength than domestic participants helped limit the build-
up and subsequent unwinding of speculative positions, thereby also limiting the in- and
outflow of associated speculative capital.
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A third channel of capital flows was portfolio investment in the stock market.
Interestingly, the net outflow of capital on that account in the period May-September
1998 was only about 260 million dollars (Table 8). Unfortunately, there is no data
available on the turnover of stocks broken down according to residents and non-
residents. The finding that a relatively small amount of capital left Hungary on account
of net stock selling by non-residents could mean either that non-residents were holding
Hungarian stocks in a longer term perspective, or that they were caught by the sudden
sharp fall in prices to levels at which it became attractive to hold on to the stocks. The
view was expressed at that time that the fall in Hungarian stock prices may have been
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due to massive selling by non-residents taking advantage of higher liquidity of the
Hungarian stock market compared to other emerging markets. As the Russian crisis
shook the confidence of investors in emerging market stocks, the Hungarian stock
market would have been the scene of a “sell what you can not what you want”
syndrome. The small amount of net selling by non-residents of Hungarian stocks does
not support that view. Investor confidence returned fairly rapidly after the Russian crisis,
as net non-resident portfolio in the stock market began to rise starting already in October
1998.
Table 8: Non-Resident Net Portfolio Investment Flows into Hungarian Stocks, 1996-99 (millions
of dollars)
1996 1997 1998 1999
January 1 -129 6 -3
February 31 -80 75 172
March 53 4 368 21
April 42 34 67 128
May 13 340 -161 207
June 75 10 -110 340
July 80 73 97
August 43 74 -55
September 4 -10 -32
October -7 53 51
November 8 462 86
December 16 173 162
Source: National Bank of Hungary
The intervention of NBH during August-October 1998 amounted to 2.5 billion
dollars (Table 7), but international reserves fell by only 1.5 billion dollars (to 8.3 billion,
4.3 month of imports at the end-October 1998). The difference is largely explained by
the increase in the deposits of commercial banks with NBH. Hungarian banks collect
foreign exchange deposits from resident households and companies, a large part of
which is redeposited with the NBH. As mentioned, when speculators built up open
positions at the futures foreign exchange market, banks obtained the foreign exchange to
buy forints partly by borrowing from abroad and partly by drawing down their deposits
with NBH. When the operations were reversed, the foreign exchange that banks bought
from NBH against forint was in part used to repay the loans from abroad and in part
redeposited with NBH. The fact that Hungarian banks accumulated foreign exchange
deposits with NBH which they could use to cover part of their futures foreign exchange
transactions helped mitigate the in- and outflow of capital, but the pressure on the
exchange rate through conversions remained the same as if the capital flows actually
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took place; only the level of reserves fluctuated less. NBH generally offers sub-Libor
rates for commercial bank deposits and banks find it useful to maintain a certain level of
foreign exchange working balances with NBH. This is a form of short-term borrowing
the cost of which is relatively low, but its level needs to be monitored closely when
assessing the adequacy of reserves.
The correction of the stock market overreaction and the forced liquidation of
speculative positions in the futures foreign exchange market in the wake of the Russian
crisis led to losses estimated at about 0.4 percent of GDP in the financial sector26.
Before tax profits of banks decreased dramatically in the second half of 1998 and it is
estimated that over half of the 87 brokerage houses closed 1998 with a loss.27 Twelve
brokerage firms not backed by banks went bankrupt. These are not insignificant losses.
However, no bank went down because of the financial turmoil and the banking system
as a whole remained strong, with the average capital adequacy ratio staying at 17
percent at end-1998, the same as at end-199728. In a way, the Russian crisis served as a
lesson for the relatively inexperienced Hungarian investors, driving it home that
speculation on the stock market and the foreign exchange derivative markets is not a one
way street. Hopefully, this will reduce the risk of bubbles building up in the future
contributing to the stability of markets. 
                                             
26 Since open positions at the futures stock index market reached about 0.3 percent of GDP and stock
prices fell by about 50 percent, the loss attributable to futures stock index activities was about 0.15
percent of annual GDP. Total forward and futures foreign exchange open positions are estimated to have
reached approximately 6 percent of GDP. Since the forint depreciated by about 4 percent, the negative
cash flow implied by forward and futures foreign exchange rate transactions is estimated at 0.25 percent
of GDP. In total, the negative cash flow effect of forward and futures activities is estimated to have
reached about 0.4 percent of GDP, which had to be assumed mostly by the financial sector as many
speculators were unable to pay.
27 Because banks in Hungary were prohibited from engaging in stock and futures market transactions at
the Budapest exchanges until 1999, several banks have set up their own brokerage houses. Since the
beginning of 1999, regulation has moved toward universal banking, allowing banks to carry out stock and
futures market transactions.
28 The Hungarian banking system has been largely privatized. The private sector accounts for about 80
percent of the banking system’s share capital and foreign-owned banks represent about 60 percent of the
share capital.
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6. Concluding Remarks
We found no empirical evidence in the cases examined that the intensity of capital flows
and the associated pressures on the exchange rates and interest rates were primarily
influenced by the exchange rate regime itself. For example, heavy central bank
intervention (and consequent increases in reserves) to limit the appreciation of the
currency occurred both in a more flexible (Poland and Israel) and a less flexible
(Hungary) exchange regime. A sudden external shock, such as the Russian financial
crisis, caused interest rates to increase both in a narrow band (Hungary) and a wide band
(Israel) exchange regime. If policies are sound and credible, the impact of external
shocks on the exchange rates and interest rates diminishes even in wide band regime, as
seen in the case of Greece after it has joined the ERM. We did not find evidence that the
exchange regime had any significant effect on stock market behavior at the time of
financial crises. The only thing that the nature of the exchange regime seems to directly
influence at times of global financial crises is the variability of the nominal and real
exchange rates: the more flexible regimes experienced greater variability. However,
even this observation needs to be nuanced. The Greek experience before and after ERM
membership underlines the important role of policies. The commitment to achieving the
Maastricht criteria and the consequent visible improvement in Greece’s external and
internal balances no doubt explains why exchange rate variability did not increase when
the country moved from a de facto rigid crawling peg to a fixed but wide band regime.
The argument is often made that in a less flexible exchange regime, the “oppression” of
exchange rate variability translates into greater interest rate variability. We found that
the less flexible Hungarian regime with lower exchange rate variability was not
accompanied by greater interest rate variability; on the contrary, interest rate variability
in Hungary was lower during the periods of crises than in the other countries examined.
In sum, our study of the reaction to global financial crises under different exchange
regimes does not make a strong case for the choice of any particular regime.
For countries potentially exposed to volatile capital movements, a key question
when considering the issue of exchange regime choice is to what extent the exchange
rate system adopted may encourage overborrowing from abroad. The usual argument is
that a fixed rate or a narrow band regime encourages foreign borrowing when the
fundamentals are on the right track and there is an interest rate premium. A sudden
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shock, such as a regional financial crisis, will then lead to a devaluation, causing serious
losses for enterprises and banks. A floating rate, on the other hand, reduces the incentive
to borrow in foreign exchange, due to the greater uncertainty involved. 
Did the least flexible exchange regime considered in our study, the Hungarian
narrow band, encourage overborrowing? There was certainly an element of
overborrowing by banks associated with speculation at the futures foreign exchange
markets, but this was probably due to the good macroeconomic indicators of the country
at that time, which enhanced the credibility of the exchange rate, rather than to the
narrow band, since even a depreciation within the band would have entailed -- as in fact
it did -- large losses for the speculators. The same is true for foreign investors who held
domestic currency denominated government securities. Looking at foreign borrowing by
enterprises, the experiences of the Czech Republic under the floating regime and of
Hungary under the narrow band regime do not reveal a major difference. In both
countries, the share of foreign exchange borrowing from domestic banks and from
abroad in total credits to enterprises grew substantially over time, even if that share was
somewhat higher in Hungary than in the Czech Republic at end–1998 (Table 9). The
reason why there is no significant difference between the two cases probably lies in the
increasing share in production of multinational companies which account for most of
the enterprise borrowing from abroad. These companies, which produce mostly for
exports, have easy access to credit from abroad and a large part of their income is in
foreign exchange. They probably consider their risks lower if a part of their borrowings
is also in foreign exchange. In other words, these market participants hedge their risks
by borrowing from abroad and they do not seem to be that sensitive to the exchange rate
regime in place. The share of foreign direct investment in GDP is higher in Hungary
than in the Czech Republic. This could be an indication that the share in production of
multinational companies is higher in Hungary, which could explain the higher share of
foreign borrowing in that country.
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Table 9: Outstanding Enterprise Borrowings in Foreign Exchange and Foreign Direct
Investment, 1993-98 (in percent) (1)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Share of foreign exchange Hungary 9.7 11.9 23.5 31.5 29.5 32.2
credits from domestic banks in
total domestic bank credits
Czech Republic 4.5 6.6 13.5 16.4 24.8 27.9
Share of total foreign exchange Hungary 33.6 42.2 54.3 57.6 51.2 55.1
credits in total borrowings Czech Republic 16.7 20.8 28.1 32.4 40.6 43.4
Foreign direct investment  /
GDP
Hungary 15.9 18.5 29.4 34.4 37.8 33.3
Czech Republic 10.2 11.1 14.5 15.3 19.4 22.6
(1) end-year data
Sources: National Bank of Hungary and Czech National Bank
The risk of overborrowing remains a serious problem when the exchange rate is
credible and there is a domestic interest rate premium.29 When capital movements are
largely liberalized, it is difficult to reconcile the goal of discouraging oveborrowing and
that of maintaining a credible exchange rate system by following sound maroeconomic
policies, which at times means maintaining the level of domestic interest rates above the
level of foreign interest rates. In such circumstances, capital controls may be of some
help. We are fully aware of the benefits of free capital movements. However, a
premature liberalization of short-term capital movements may have more disadvantages
than benefits. Emerging markets are too vulnerable to contagion which, as seen, can
trigger sudden outflows of capital that entered the country previously, even if the given
country has followed sensible policies. There is a vast amount of what is essentially
short-term capital ready to take a higher risk and buy fixed income instruments in
emerging markets in order to take advantage of higher returns. Fund managers
throughout the world invest a small portion of their portfolio in emerging markets to
maximize returns. Investment banks offer dedicated emerging market funds to investors,
while advising them to invest only a small portion of their total portfolio into such
funds. This all sounds very conservative from the point of view of the investor, but it
adds up to tens of billions of volatile dollars available to move around among emerging
markets. Compared to the size of these markets, the capital flows can be substantial and
cause large volatility in the exchange rate and/or entail costly sterilization and loss of
reserves. Derivatives markets might not be of help to moderate the impact of exchange
                                             
29 For a modeling of the overborrowing syndrome, see McKinnon and Pill (1999).
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rate fluctuations as seen in the case of Hungary, where the futures market was used
primarily for financial speculation and not for hedging of trade transactions.
Short-term capital controls are notoriously ineffective once trade and long-term
capital movements have been liberalized. They can nevertheless mute the magnitude of
short-term capital movements by throwing sand into the wheels until such time that the
vulnerability to speculative attacks has been greatly reduced by the solidification of the
country’s credibility. Also, for a full liberalization to be acceptable, the country has to
be in a position where it can tolerate a possible real appreciation of its currency beyond
that justified by the Balassa-Samuelson effect30, a condition that is seldom acceptable
for small catching-up economies which face balance of payments constraints.
Alternatively, it has to accept the cost of sterilization which can reach a point where it
becames no longer tolerable. 
In light of the experiences of the recent years, those who have been urging
emerging markets to fully liberalize capital movements should reflect on the experiences
of the recent crises and perhaps have another careful look at the usefulness of short-term
capital controls. Such controls have a limited, but positive role to play during the
catching-up period, when the credibility of the country has increased enough to attract
fixed income portfolio investment, but not yet enough to prevent the sudden outflow of
that investment when the herd instinct takes over the financial markets. We mentioned
that the restriction imposed by the Hungarian authorities on non-resident holdings of
forint denominated government securities helped to discourage the inflow of capital.
This restriction needs to be closely monitored though, because it can be circumvented by
repurchase agreements as experienced in Hungary.
It is important to set limits on the banks’ foreign exchange open positions to
prevent the buildup of excessive speculative position by banks. Since forward and
futures foreign exchange positions are off balance sheet items, the limits should be set
on positions which include these items. It is also important to set the limits on a
consolidated basis, including the positions of brokerage houses owned by the banks in
order the avoid that banks take on excessive risks through their brokerage companies.
These limits need to be supplemented by tight deposit and margin requirements for
opening positions on the futures foreign exchange markets. It helps if only residents are
                                             
30 Halpern-Wyplosz (1997) discusses the Balassa-Samuelson effect for catching-up economies.
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allowed to the futures foreign exchange markets; if non-residents are also allowed, the
risk of an excessive buildup of speculative positions greatly increases. When foreign
borrowing by enterprises is liberalized, it is useful to maintain a notification requirement
so that the authorities can monitor the development of foreign debt. 
When there is a very rapid accumulation of short-term debt, the authorities face
the trade-off of either using controls to discourage the inflow of capital or to change the
mix of interest rate and exchange rate policy. This is a difficult choice to make when the
policy mix has been successful in stabilizing the economy and there is no compelling
reason to change. Another line of defense is to accumulate reserves at the time of capital
inflows that can be used as a cushion against capital outflows. This involves sterilized
intervention and a judgement about the desired level of reserves, taking into account the
estimated size of hot money ready to leave the country in a short period of time. This
judgement is difficult to make and involves a great deal of uncertainty, including the
risk that the country holds too high reserves for too long. The opposite risk, that the
country has to give up too soon the exchange rate system that has gained credibility and
served its interests well is not less serious. A policy of using reserves as a buffer has its
limitations and its success depends on the severity of the attack; there comes a point
beyond which it does not make sense to lose reserves.
Where does all this lead us in answering the question what exchange rate system
is most appropriate for small open emerging market economies? We agree with
Williamson (1998) that free floating exposes the country to excessively large exchange
rate fluctuations given the herd behavior of exchange markets. Free floating, or wide
fluctuations bands for that matter, do not necessarily assure lower interest rates or
smaller interest rate variability. On the other hand, we know that a rigidly fixed rate is
only sustainable if the fundamentals support it. If the fixed rate is not credible, it will not
permit a reduction in the interest rate premium.
This leaves us with the question of what degree of flexibility is desirable. It
makes sense to have a wider band in the case of a fixed rate since questions about the
sustainability of a fixed peg may arise more quickly. In a crawling peg system where the
rate of crawl is set in accordance with the fundamentals, a narrower band, by reducing
uncertainty, may provide the benefits of both lower interest rate premium and smaller
exchange rate variability, combining the benefits of a nominal anchor with flexibility.
The case for the wider band generally rests on the argument that it provides a shock
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absorber in the face of volatile capital flows and gives a broader room for manoeuvre for
monetary policy to influence domestic economic developments. That advantage has to
be weighted against the possible costs of higher interest rate premium and/or excessive
appreciation or depreciation of the currency. It should be emphasized, however, that an
exchange rate regime can not be qualified as “good” as “bad” per se, only in conjunction
with the other elements of macroeconomic policies, particularly fiscal, monetary and
incomes policies. A fixed exchange rate can be appropriate if all the other policies are in
place to sustain it. If the political commitment to maintain the fixed rate is strong, it can
even help forge the necessary consensus to adopt those policies, as it did for example in
Austria during the hard currency policy period from the 1970s to the 1990s. If the
supportive policies are credibly in place, wide band regimes can provide as much
stability as narrow band regimes.
There remains the question whether anything can be done in the source countries
to discourage the flow of hot money into emerging markets. It is quite remarkable that
investment banks and hedge funds bought Russian GKO’s up to a few weeks prior to
the collapse of the Russian market. Perhaps the fund managers’ structure of incentives,
which rewards profit but not the loss which was not made, needs to be reconsidered. A
fund manager who is fired after he made a huge loss is like putting on a raincoat after
rain.
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